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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
get specific decisions on all the points that may arise under the
statutes of the traditional type; that process may take many
years.
ROBERT J. HOLLAND
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE IN MONTANA
The Restatement of the Law of Torts provides that:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily
harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a
structure or other artificial condition which he main-
tains upon the land, if
a. the place where the condition is maintained is one
upon which the possessor knows or should know that
such children are likely to trespass, and
b. the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
should know and which he realizes or should realize
as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm to such children, and
c. the children because of their youth do not discover
the condition or realize the risk involved in inter-
meddling in it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
d. the utility to the possessor of maintaining the con-
dition is slight as compared to the risk to young chil-
dren involved therein."
Students of tort law will note with satisfaction that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court evidenced awareness of the implications of
this statement in its recent decision of January 16, 1952, Nichols
v. Consolidated Dairies of Lake County.
The attractive nuisance doctrine traces its origin to an Eng-
lish case decided in 1841, wherein a defendant who left a horse
and cart unattended on the street was held liable after a child
climbed on the cart and was then thrown off and injured when
the horse started suddenly at the urging of another child."
Sioux City and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stout,' decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1873, is generally considered the
leading American case on the doctrine,' though there appear to
1§ 339.
....... Mont ...... . 239 P. (2d) 740 (1952).
'Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
'17 Wall. (U.S.) 657 (1873).
'Hudson, The Turntable Caaes in the Federal Court8, 36 HAiav. L. Rgv.
826 (1922-23).
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have been earlier ones decided in a few state courts.! It was in
the Stout case that the doctrine received its popular name "turn-
table doctrine," since the railroad company was held liable when
plaintiff, a child 6 years old, received a crushed foot while play-
ing around a turntable on its property where it knew children
were in the habit of playing. Liability was predicated on negli-
gence in failing to repair a broken lock on the turntable, it being
considered that the defendant owed this duty to children whom
it knew were apt to trespass, play on the turntable, and be in-
jured. It was also thought that defendant was negligent in not
making more effort to keep the children away.
Following the decision in the Stout case, which has been
followed quite generally in the federal courts,' the state courts
seem to have taken three positions on the doctrine. Manley 0.
Hudson,' writing in 36 Harv. L. Rev. in 1922-23, ointed out that
a majority of the states, 23 in number, approved the doctrine and
allowed recovery even though the child was a trespasser. Some
13 states denied any recovery under the doctrine, and 7 states,
including Montana, distinguished the turntable cases! and allowed
recovery only if it were shown that the nuisance was so especially
and unusually alluring to children of tender years as to con-
stitute an implied invitation," or that the landowner had neg-
lected some usual and customary precaution,' or that the child
was in fact tempted onto the land by the thing occasioning the
injury," etc.' Of the five states not covered by Hudson's survey,
68upra, note 5, see p. 826 and note 3.
"Supra, note 5, p. 831.
OProfessor of Law, Harvard, 1919-23, and at present. He has been very
active in international law, the League of Nations, etc.9Supra, note 5, (see note 103 p. 854 for a listing of the states in the
various catagories).
"0Driscoll v. Clark, 32 Mont. 172, 80 P. 373 (1905) ; Gates v. Nor. Pac. R.R.
Co., 37 Mont. 103. 94 P. 751 (1908) ; Martin v. Nor. Pac. R.R. Co., 51
Mont. 31, 149 P. 89 (1915) ; Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lbr. Co., 55 Idaho
543, 44 P. (2d) 1103 (1935) ; Wheeler v. City of St. Helens, 153 Or. 610,
58 P. (2d) 501 (1936), to cite a few.
uSalladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 12 Ariz. 348,
100 P. 441 (1909).
"Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land and Irrigation Co., 53 Mont. 254,
163 P. 473 (1917) ; Salt River Valley Water Users' Association v. Comp-
ton, 40 Ariz. 282, 11 P. (2d) 839 (1932), wherein plaintiff was denied
recovery after being injured while climbing a pole on defendant's land,
beeause it was not the pole but a bird's nest on top of the pole which
had attracted him onto the land.
'Supra, note 5, see note 103 p. 854 for a list showing the position of 43
of the 48 states on the doctrine. A check of the General and American
Digests through March, 1952, indicates that substantially the same
classification, with only a few changes, would apply today. For in-
stance, Maryland, listed as a state which distinguishes the turntable
cases, held in State, to Use of Lorenze v. Machen, 164 Md. 579, 164 A.
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one, Florida, has definitely adopted the doctrine,1' while another,
Wyoming, has refused to apply it in at least two cases and ap-
parently disapproves of it. Nevada, New Mexico, and North Da-
kota have evidently had no cases rendering a decision as to
whether the doctrine applies. On the whole it is the opinion of
this author that the attractive nuisance doctrine has held its own
in the last quarter century and has probably gained in breadth
of application.
Of course the greatest stumbling block to the courts in ap-
plying the doctrine has been the general rule that a landowner
owes no duty to those who trespass on his land other than to re-
frain from wilfully or wantonly injuring them. Many courts,
including Montana's, have attempted to compromise the tres-
passer status of the child by implying from the attractive nature
of the nuisance an invitation to him to come onto the land. This
makes the child an invitee and casts a duty on the landowner to
exercise ordinary care to make the premises reasonably safe for
him, taking into consideration the propensities of children. An-
other view taken is that the landowner has set up something in the
nature of a trap for children who are too young to appreciate the
danger. This puts the case within a well recognized exception to
695 (1933), that the attractive nuisance doctrine does not obtain In
Maryland. However, the general tenor of that opinion seems to Indi-
cate that they would still distinguish the cases where an invitation
could be implied. Pennsylvania, listed as denying liability, adopted the
restatement*view in Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A. (2d)
729 (1942), and has since consistently followed it. See also Bartleson
et al. v. Glen Alden Coal Co. et al., 361 Pa. 519, 64 A. (2d) 846 (1949).
Michigan will now apply the doctrine where what is termed a "technical
trespass" is found, i.e. where the child is rightfully on the land as a
licensee but trespasses by playing with or taking the instrumentality
as the sponstaneous and natural act of an irresponsible child immedi-
ately attracted to the object. See Petrak v. Cooke Contracting Co., 329
Mich. 564, 46 N.W. (2d) 574, 576 (1951) ; Butrick v. Snyder, 236 Mich.
300, 210 N.W. 311 (1926). New York is listed as denying liability.
However, in Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 597, 271
App. Div. 122 (1946), a lower New York court (Supr. Ct., App. Div., 3rd
Dept.) applied the restatement view. Subsequently, in Eason v. State,
104 N.Y.S. (2d) 683 (1951), another lower court (Court of Claims) held,
without mentioning the Clifton case, that the attractive nuisance doc-
trine, when applied in New York, is applied almost exclusively to dan-
gerous attractions in the highway, and that the same attraction off the
highway, even though in close proximity thereto, does not impose lia-
bility. Vermont, while still denying liability generally, has applied the
doctrine by statute to dilapidated buildings. See Trudo v. Lazarus, 116
Vt. 221, 73 A. (2d) 306 (1950) ; also V.S. § 10.361.
"Johnson v. Wood, 155 Fla. 753, 21 So. (2d) 353 (1945) ; also Allen v.
William P. McDonald Corp ........ Fla ........ 42 So. (2d) 706 (1949), which
applied the doctrine to an artificial pond on the theory that it was so
constructed as to be a trap.
"Wilson v. City of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 199 P. (2d) 119 (1949) ; Maher
v. City of Casper, 67 Wyo. 268, 219 P. (2d) 125 (1950).
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the rule of non-liability for injury to trespassers. ' However these
theories are pure fiction, since obviously the landowner has not
intended to invite children onto his premises when he sets up an
attractive instrumentality thereon, nor has he any intent of
trapping them. It seems to this author that it is far better for
the courts to recognize that the child is a trespasser and that the
doctrine of attractive nuisance is another exception to the gen-
eral rule of non-liability to trespassers. Taking into account the
known propensities of children, the supposedly enlightened posi-
tion of the human race as compared with the days when much of
the common law was formulated, and the interests of society in
the securing of the young from needless injury, the general rule
should be capable of being modified in this wise. Hudson was
also of this opinion when he wrote on the subject over 25 years
ago.1'
As Hudson points out, there are several interests which com-
pete for protection in the ordinary attractive nuisance case.'
There is the interest of the child in being, in some measure, pro-
tected prior to injury as well as in being adequately compensated
for an injury which is really the fault of the landowner who has
failed to take into account the natural instincts of children. It is
well known that those instincts lead them to investigate and play
about unusual instrumentalities, oblivious of the danger that may
be involved and, as often as not, completely unmindful of any
trespass. While many courts have been influenced by the fact
that a recovery would merely redound to the benefit of the child's
parents, ' this seems a poor argument for refusing to allow a re-
covery by the child, since it is the child who has endured the pain
and suffering and who will often suffer more in the future from
any resulting handicap or from the possible inability of the par-
ents to provide the funds necessary for proper care and treat-
ment. It seems to this author that, except where the parent is
clearly able to bear the burden, no court is justified in denying
the child recovery because the parent may have been negligent,
even though the parent benefits from the recovery through the
fact that the landowner pays for the treatment of the child. In
any event the child should recover for pain, suffering, and future
handicap. Of course if the child is killed it is inescapable that
any recovery must directly benefit the parent, and it would seem
reasonable to allow the parent's negligence to defeat the recovery.
"665 C.J.S. Negligence § 29(2).
"Supra, note 5, p. 828.IsSupra, note 5, pp. 839 and following.
'Supra, note 5, p. 839.
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The interest of the bereaved parent must be considered where
the child has been killed and, to a lesser extent, the expectancy
of a dependent parent on a child's future earnings. As Hudson
points out, these interests are very difficult to value. However,
while damages are seldom allowed for the mental anguish occa-
sioned by the child's death,' the weight of authority seems to per-
mit the parent to recover for the loss of the child's society and
companionship,' and the latter interest should be taken into con-
sideration by the courts in jurisdictions allowing such recovery.
The interest in future earnings seems much more doubtful. Where
the child has been injured the parent has a great interest in re-
ceiving compensation for the added burdens which are thrust
upon him in seeing that the child is treated, as well as in caring
for a child who may have been handicapped.
Opposing these interests is that of the landowner in the free
and uninhibited development of his land. Where the develop-
ment and use made of the land is of great benefit to the com-
munity it may well tilt the scales in favor of the landowner, even
though he would otherwise be liable. Hudson pointed this out
as does Restatement, Torts, Section 339, Comment F. How-
ever, the restatement would hold him liable regardless of the
usefulness of the instrumentality if it is practicable to safeguard
the thing at a reasonable cost. It will be remembered that this
was the basis of liability in the Stout case. Judge Lewis, in
United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt,' pointed out that he had
less hesitation in applying the doctrine where the instrumentality
complained of was, as in that case, put to no useful, ornamental
or other purpose of enjoyment.
Finally there are to be considered the social interests in-
2'See 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 55, and the General and Decennial
Digests, Death § 89.
2n67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 55 intimates that the weight of authority
denies recovery for loss of society and companionship. However a check
of the General and Decennial Digests, Death, § 88 seems to indicate
that the majority of jurisdictions allow such recovery.
"264 F. 785 (1920), wherein defendants had allowed to stand on their
premises an abandoned chemical plant. Water gathering in the base-
ment was contaminated with sulphuric acid and zinc sulphate which
poisoned plaintiff's sons when they came onto the land, found the pool,
and went in swimming. Defendant was held liable below for their
deaths even though the pool was not shown to have been, in fact, the
thing that attracted the boys onto the land. Also the court imputed
to defendant knowledge of the trespass or the likelihood thereof and
consent thereto from the fact that the public habitually crossed the
premises at will. This judgment was later reversed by the U. S.
Supreme Court which granted certiorari. On review, Mr. Justice Holmes
pointed out that the pool could not be seen from the highway and that
there was no evidence that it was what attracted the boys onto the land.
See infra, note 35.
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volved. Society has interests both in the security of child life
and in the freedom of land development and enterprise. Hudson
points this out and also states: "The social interest in keeping
the earth's surface free from menaces to small children is all but
paramount." He also indicates that this interest is accentuated
by the fact that" so many other menaces to child life now exist. "'
The word "now" refers to the year 1923 when the article as
written. It is the belief of this author that, as of the present time,
the social interest in keeping the earth's surface free from men-
aces to small children is definitely paramount and if it was ac-
centuated by "other menaces" existing in 1923, consider for a
moment how much more this is a factor in 1952. It would seem
that society would be justified in restricting the landowner's free
use of his land even to the point of requiring quite sizable ex-
penditures for safety devices where it is well known that children
are apt to trespass and, due to their childish propensities, be in-
jured by dangerous instrumentalities. What seems an excellent
example of the present-day tendency to subordinate the interests
of property owners in the unrestricted use of their property to
the interests of public safety is found in the advent in compara-
tively recent years of municipal zoning laws." In the light of
this development alone it seems reasonable to this author that
there is much justification in expecting the further extension,
also, of the attractive nuisance doctrine and the imposition on
landowners of a greater burden of care in the protection of the
public interest in child welfare and safety.
Hudson points out that it is debatable whether extension of
the doctrine would promote child safety,' but it would certainly
promote the general welfare of injured children and their par-
ents and it seems highly arguable that it would promote child
safety generally, since corporate landowners are apt to exercise
greater care in protecting trespassing children from dangerous
instrumentalities on their land when they find that they will be
liable if they do not, even though individual landowners may be
slower to learn of the state of the law. It would seem also that
what constitutes a reasonable expenditure for safety devices or
an unreasonable hindrance of the landowner in the use of his
"Supra, note 5, p. 840 and note 50.
"At the time Hudson wrote the zoning law was in its infancy. Justice
Adams in State v. Roberson, 198 N.C. 70, 150 S.E. 674 (1929), points
out that only a few years previous to that time zoning laws would have
been invalid. Compare, also, the multitude of cases on zoning laws In
the 4th and 5th Decennial Digests with the comparatively few in the
3rd Decennial. See Municipal Corps. §§ 600, 601, 3rd, 4th, and 5th De-
cennial Digests.
'Supra, note 5, p. 841.
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instrumentality would have to be decided in the light of the ap-
parent modern tendency to further subordinate proprietary in-
terests to the public interests.
As Hudson indicates, in balancing up these interests it is un-
desirable to use a set of rigid rules, but rather the application of
the dotcrine should depend on the variables arising in the cases."
He states that a standard of judgment is at hand in the general
legal standard of social conduct, i.e. our requirement that one
who acts in society, whether it be merely to maintain land, to con-
duct operations upon it or to place its product upon the market,
must use due care under the circumstances.' Modern conditions
and tendencies seem, to this writer, to justify weighing the inter-
ests more heavily against the landowner. However, the restate-
ment appears to be a reasonable compromise between a view which
would exonerate the landowner and one which would impose a
very strict liability with little regard for attendant circumstances.
The first decision on the attractive nuisance doctrine by the
Montana Supreme Court appears to have been rendered in 1905
when that Court refused to find liability under it in Driscoll v.
Clark.' In that case defendant was operating an unguarded con-
veyor chain within ten feet of a main street. Plaintiff, a child
of 5 years, was in the habit of playing around the machine as
were other children to defendant's knowledge. Plaintiff became
entangled in the chain and was badly injured. The court, speak-
ing through Chief Justice Brantly in an opinion prepared by
Commissioner Clayberg, seemed to apply the same rule to tres-
passing children as would be applicable to trespassing adults and
held that there was no duty to warn the trespassing child of open
and apparent dangers even though the child was unable to ap-
preciate them and that there was no duty to keep a lookout for
children and warn them off the premises even though it was
well known that they were in the habit of playing there. The
case turned primarily on the facts that the child was a trespasser
and that the complaint did not allege facts from which an implied
invitation to come onto the premises could be worked out. The
court held that before such an invitation could be implied the
complaint must allege that the machinery was so especially and
unusually attratcive to children as to extend an implied invitation
to them to come onto the premises. The mere fact that the ma-
chinery did attract children to defendant's knowledge was held
insufficient. The court considered an implied invitation a neces-
'Supra, note 5, p. 844.
'Supra, note 5, pp. 844, 845.
"32 Mont. 172, 80 P. 373 (1905).
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sary prerequisite to liability and then seemingly made it as diffi-
cult as possible to find such invitation.
Thiree years later the court decided Gates v. Northern Pacific
Railway Co.' wherein defendant had placed an old railroad car
body in a precarious position on an embankment on its right-of-
way in Missoula. Deceased, a child of 11 years, while traversing
a path across defendant's property which had long been used by
the public generally, deviated from the path to investigate the
car in its curious position. It rolled over crushing him. The
supreme court reversed and remanded the case, after a decision
below for plaintiff, on the grounds that it had not been alleged
and proved either that the defendant had knowledge of the at-
tractive character of the car or should have forseen that it was
especially and unusually attractive to children, or that deceased
was so young as not to appreciate the danger or that his trespass
was excusable. In this opinion Justice Holloway, concurring,
stated that the attractive nuisance doctrine should apply to make
a landowner liable to trespasing childen only if the following
facts exist:
"1. A child too young to appreciate the danger or be
contributorily negligent.
2. An injury caused by an unguarded, dangerous
machine or other dangerous thing' peculiarly at-
tractive to children of the class to which the in-
jured child belongs.
3. An implied invitation to come on the premises.
This may be implied from the fact that the land-
owner knew or in the exercise of ordinary care
ought to have known that such children were in the
habit of coming on his premises to play or to grati-
fy their childish curiosity.'' ®
This agreed substantially with a statement by Mr. Justice Smith,
who pointed out in the majority opinion that the special attrac-
tiveness of the nuisance might be shown by the very nature of the
thing and the fact that children were attracted to it. Justice
Brantly, strongly opposed to the turntable doctrine, was of the
opinion that the Driscoll case was applicable here and that the
child was a mere trespasser to whom the defendant owed no duty
other than to refrain from wantonly or wilfully injuring him.
Thus the case modifies the harsh doctrine of the Driscoll
case in that it imposes on a landowner, who is maintaining on his
137 Mont. 103, 94 P. 751 (1908).
'See 37 Mont. 103, p. 118; 94 P. 751, p. 755.
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premises a dangerous instrumentality which, from its nature, he
should know to be peculiarly attractive to children, some duty to
look out for trespassing children whom he knows or ought to
know are in the habit of coming to play or to gratify curiosity.
In 1914 the court decided the case of Nixon v. Montana, Wyo-
ming, and S. W. Ry.' wherein plaintiff's daughter, 8 years old,
was killed while trespassing on defendant's property. The child
had tried to board the rear car of a slow moving freight train
which was so made up that two cars were behind the caboose.
The defendant had failed to comply with a statutory duty to
fence its right-of-way at the point of the accident and knew that
children were accustomed to walk along the track in the vicinity.
The court declined to hold defendant liable because the failure
to fence was a breach of a duty owed to stockmen rather than to
children, there was no showing that a train made up with cars
behind the caboose was more attractive to children than other
trains, and because, even though the habitual use of the track as
a highway by children imposed a duty on defendant to look out
for them, an implied license to so use the track was not a license
to board trains traveling thereon. The court pointed out that an
invitation may be implied from especially or unusually attractive
instrumentalities, but said also that a landowner might conduct
his business on his premises with such machinery operated in such
manner as might be necessary and convenient to make his busi-
ness successful; and where it did not appear but that the ma-
chinery or the use thereof was proper, necessary and convenient,
and that it was especially and unusually attractive to children,
and that its unusual attractiveness to children was known or
should have been known to the owner, no cause of action under
the turntable doctrine was held to be stated. Justice Sanner went
on to indicate that the Driscoll case had adopted the idea that
the attractive nuisance doctrine would not be applied to things
ordinarily in existence and use such as "rivers, creeks, ponds,
wagons, axes, plows, woodpiles, haystacks," etc., which are both
attractive and dangerous, since the result would be to impose a
crippling duty on landowners. Then the court stated that trains,
while attractive, are familiar objects necessary to the conduct of
the railroad business. The case is in accord generally with the
modern idea that the doctrine will not be extended so as to de-
prive a landowner of the use of his property because it is danger-
ous to children who may come uninvited onto his premises,' but
850 Mont. 95, 145 P. 8 (1914).
f65 C.J.S. Negligence, § 29 (6).
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the court fails to consider the possibility of safeguarding the
premises other than to hold that the statutory duty to fence the
right-of-way was not owed to children. No mention is made of
the failure to take affirmative steps to warn children off the
property where defendant knew they were in the habit of tres-
passing. It seems rather ironic that defendant would have been
liable if a cow had been killed but was not liable where a child
too young to thoroughly appreciate the dangers involved was
killed. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the
child was attempting to board the train.
The following year, in 1915, in Martin v. Northern Pacific
By Co.,' a decision for plaintiff below was reversed and the case
remanded on the ground that the lower court's instruction to the
jury was erroneous in omitting the element of knowledge on the
part of the defendant that the instrumentality, a damaged rail-
way car, was inherently dangerous, that it was unusually alluring
to children of tender years, and that such children were or were
likely to be attracted by it as it stood in defendant's yards. Hol-
loway points out that there are three theories advanced by the
courts to avoid the fact that the child was a trespasser. Some
treat him as a trespasser but excuse the trespass due to the land-
owner's wrongful act in tempting him by maintaining the attrac-
tive nuisance. Others imply an invitation, while others say that
he who maintains an instrumentality such as an unlocked turn-
table on his premises with knowledge of its attractiveness to chil-
dren, of its potentiality for harm, and of the probability that
such children will be attracted to it, will not be heard to say that
such children were wrongfully where their childish instincts
naturally led them. However knowledge was held to be an es-
sential element under either theory." The court also held in this
case that the attractiveness of the instrumentality causing the in-
jury must have been the proximate cause of the injury, and that
it was therefore insufficient to allege that other objects attracted
the child onto the land. This is the same position that the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion given by Mr. Justice
Holmes, took six years later in United Zinc and Chemical Co. v.
15 1 Mont. 31, 149 P. 89 (1915), wherein a boy of 7 was killed while play-
ing about a damaged railroad car standing in defendant's yards. Death
was caused by a door falling on the boy because the catch that held it
was defective.
"The court then quotes from 29 Cyc. 448 which stated that one of the
grounds for liability is that the owner knew or shoulc have known. Thus
it would probably have been sufficient had it been stated that defendant
should have known. Previous cases indicate that such was the rule.
10
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Britt.' Holmes based the doctrine on implied invitation and
stated that it must be very cautiously applied. In that case 3 jus-
tice? dissented strongly, pointing out that the attratcive nuisance
doctrine would make men more considerate of the safety of their
neighbors' children than would the harsh rule which made tres-
passers out of little children unless they were actually attracted
onto the land by the thing that caused their injury or death, in
this case a poisoned pool of water which defendant had no use
for . Holmes stated that to imply an invitation, it must appear
that defendant knowingly established and exposed, unfenced, to
children of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically as a
fish, something that is certain to attract them.
Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land and Irrigation Co.8'
was a Montana case wherein an infant 3 years old was drowned
in an irrigation canal running on land owned by defendant. The
court, speaking through Holloway, reiterated that the attractive
nuisance doctrine in Montana was based on implied invitation and
that the instrumentality causing the injury must have been, in
fact, the attraction that lured the injured child onto the land, it
being insufficient to allege that the premises were attractive to
children or that children generally were attracted thereto. Lia-
bility was held to attach only when a dangerous instrumentality
peculiarly attractive to children was maintained and "which did
lure or attract the child to her death.' ""
Following the decision in the Fusselman case the attractive
nuisance doctrine appears to have slumbered in Montana for al-
most 30 years. Then in 1945 Gilligan v. City of Butte'5 was de-
cided. This was a case wherein a 5 year old child was severely
burned when her dress caught fire after coming in contact with
a lighted signal flare being used by defendant in connection with
street repair work. The flare was located in the public street
where children commonly played to defendants knowledge and
was lighted in the middle of a bright day when there was no rea-
son for it to be lighted save defendant's negligence in failing to
extinguish it as was usually done. It was held that plaintiff could
recover. The case was not a good one for the application of the
attratcive nuisance doctrine since the street was public and the
child was, therefore, not a trespasser. However, the court does
quote with approval from cases in other jurisdictions, some of
258 U.S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 99, 66 L.Ed. 615, 36 A.L.R. 28 (1922).
'Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Day, and Chief Justice Taft.853 Mont. 254, 163 P. 473 (1917).
'
MSupra, note 37, 53 Mont. 254, 264.
1118 Mont. 350, 166 P. (2d) 797 (1945).
11
Maxwell: Attractive Nuisance in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1953
NOTES AND COMMENT
which applied the doctrine more liberally than Montana had.
The court quoted from Barrett v. Southern Co." to the general
effect that a reasonable man is presumed to know that a child
of tender years will exercise only the care and self-restraint be-
longing to childhood, and will govern himself accordingly, taking
into account childish instincts and lack of discretion and appre-
ciation of danger; and that it has been held to be an act of negli-
gence to leave, unguarded and exposed to the observation of little
children, dangerous and attractive machinery which they would
naturally be attracted to without appreciation of the danger.
The general tenor of the decision seems to be to rely more heavily
on what the defendant knew or should have known about the
propensities of children and less on any finding of implied in-
vitation from the especially or unusually attractive character of
the instrumentality. However, the Montana court also mentions
implied invitation in a quotation from the Fusselman case. The
court in both the Fusselman case and the Gilligan case quotes
from Thompson on Negligence to the effect that: "It would be a
barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land liable
for setting a trap thereon baited with stinking meat, so that his
neighbor's dog, attracted by his natural instincts, might run into
it and be killed; and which would exempt from liability for the
consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a
dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child, attracted to it
and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong,
might thereby be killed or maimed for life. "'
Finally, in 1952, the Montana Supreme Court apparently
took a great step forward in its application of the doctrine of at-
tractive nuisance when it decided Nichols v. Consolidated Dairies
of Lake County.'" In this case the plaintiff, a boy of 12, was play-
ing about a grain elevator owned by defendant, and inside of
which was a manually operated passenger elevator, consisting of
a platform suspended by ropes and operated by arranging coun-
terbalances so as to approximately equal the combined weight of
a passenger and the elevator platform, after which a man could
1091 Calif. 296, 27 Pac. 666 (1891), wherein defendant was held liable
when a child of 8 was injured while playing on a turntable which de-
fendant kept latched in the usual way, when defendant knew or in the
exercise of common sense should have known that children might be at-
tracted to it and injured. Defendant was held liable even though it
chased the children off whenever it found them on the premises. There
was no mention of implied invitation and no mention of the rule that
the instrumentality must, in fact, have lured the child onto the land.I1 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE (1st Ed. 1880), p. 305.
12 ...... Mont ....... 239 P. (2d) 740 (1952).
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pull himself up by means of a rope and pulley arrangement.
Plaintiff was attracted to this while playing in defendant's build-
ing and stepped onto the platform after which it evidently was
loosed in some manner, and, since the counterbalances outweighed
the boy and the platform, the elevator was pulled to the top of the
building where the rope broke causing the platform to fall about
50 feet and resulting in injury to plaintiff.
In this case the plaintiff filed a complaint containing three
counts which was demurred to generally and the demurrer sus-
tained in the district court. The first count alleged that plain-
tiff was a boy of tender years; that the injury was caused by a
passenger elevator which was a "dangerous and unsafe" instru-
mentality; that the defendant knew the grain elevator premises
were "peculiarly alluring and attractive to children of tender
years"; and that prior to the date of the accident the defendant
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should
have known that children were on the premises and playing on
or about the passenger elevator; and further that defendant per-
mitted them to play there, failed to secure the instrumentality so
as to prevent children from operating it, and had negligently al-
lowed the safety catch and brakes to get out of repair. The sec-
ond count was like the first except that it alleged that defendant
"knew or should have known" that the condition existed, and
that children were attracted to the (grain) elevator and were
playing in and around the premises. In considering whether
these counts stated causes of action the court went back to the
Gates case'" and quoted with approval the statement made therein
by Justice Smith to the effect that when one brings or artificially
creates something on his land especially attractive to children, as
shown by the nature of the thing itself and the fact that children
were attracted to it, leaving it exposed where they are likely to
come in contact with it, either as a plaything or through curiosity,
and such contact is obviously dangerous to them, the person so
exposing the thing is bound to reasonably anticipate the injury
and use ordinary care to guard it and prevent the injury. The
court also quotes from the same case the conditions outlined by
Holloway as being necessary for the application of the doctrine,
to-wit: A child too young to appreciate the danger, injury caused
by an unguarded dangerous thing peculiarly attractive to the
class of children to which the injured child belongs, and an im-
plied invitation to come on the premises, such to be implied from
the fact that the landowner in exercising ordinary care knew
"Supra, note 29.
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or ought to have known that children were in the habit of coming
there to play or gratify curiosity. The court then quotes Re-
statement, Torts, Section 339, which is set out at the beginning
of this article and which does not require an implied invitation
nor that the thing be especially or unusually attratcive to chil-
dren, but only knowledge or reason for knowledge by the land-
owner of the likelihood of a trespass by children and that the
condition involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
harm to children, that the children do not discover the risk be-
cause of their youth, and that the utility to the possessor is slight
compared to the risk to children involved. The court then points
out that a cause of action is stated by the first two counts under
both the restatement view and the view expressed by Holloway in
the Gates case. Thus, while the court does not expressly adopt
the restatement view, the conclusion seems inescapable that it
considers that view a satisfactory expression of the doctrine, and
that a cause of action was stated thereunder, even though the
facts may have been such as to justify an implied invitation also.
The court then takes another great step forward and, com-
pletely ignoring the Martin and Fusselman cases, states that
'when it is alleged that the person maintaining the artificial con-
ditions knows that children of tender years are on the premises
and in the building it is not necessary that the instrumentality be
the one that attracted them into the building. This is not exactly
the restatement view since it appears that the landowner here has
to know that children are, in fact, on the land before it becomes
immaterial whether the instrumentality lured them thereon,
whereas the restatement, in comment a, makes the landowner
liable regardless of whether the instrumentality attracted the
children to the land if he knew or should have known that they
were likely to trespass, find it after trespassing, and intermeddle
with it. However, the court, in connection with the second count
wherein it was alleged that defendant knew or should have known
that the condition existed and that children were attracted to the
(grain) elevator" and were playing in and around the premises,
says there is a sufficient allegation of negligence under the torts
restatement rule. T~is seems almost tantamount to a statement
to the effect that defendant would be liable if he knew or should
have known that children were likely to trespass and thereafter
come in contact with and be injured by the instrumentality, since
it was apparently not alleged that the passenger elevator at-
"There is some ambiguity in the second count at this point as to whether
the grain elevator or the passenger elevator is meant.
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tracted the boy onto the land. In view of the court's apparent
approval of the restatement position, it seems not unreasonable
to suppose that the rule in Montana now is that a defendant will
be liable in any event if he knew or should have known that chil-
dren were likely to trespass, intermeddle, and be injured, regard-
less of whether the instrumentality in fact attracted the child
onto the land.
In the course of this decision the court also adopts the view
of Restatement, Torts, Section 339, Comment F, and holds
that even though an instrumentality is a necessary device and has
great utility to the landowner, he will nevertheless be liable for
a failure to install or keep in repair safety devices which it may
be practicable to install without burdensome cost or serious inter-
ference.
It is rather difficult to tell whether or not the court, in this
decision, intended to cast out completely the theory of implied
invitation since it quotes, with apparent approval, Holloway's
position which required an implied invitation as well as the re-
statement view which does not. However, it seems very reason-
able to suppose that the court has, in effect, taken a more realistic
position and no longer considers an implied invitation a necessary
prerequisite, though if one can be implied it will be permissible
to do so. It is said in this case that "when children were per-
mitted to play in and about the grain elevator premises without
objection on the part of the defendant, it is implied that they are
there with defendant's consent and that defendant knew or
should have known that they would be attracted to and likely
come into contact with such an instrumentality as a self-operated
elevator."" This is not an unreasonable implication and is not,
in the least, inconsistent with the idea of eliminating the neces-
sity of an implied invitation as a prerequisite to liability. Also,
under the holding in the Nixon case" an invitation to play on the
premises would not be construed as an invitation to use the pas-
-senger elevator. The court concluded by ordering that the de-
murrer be overruled as to counts one and two, sustaining it only
as to the third count which was not based on attractive nuisance
and which will not be discussed here.
Thus it would appear to this author that the Montana Su-
preme Court has finally adopted the view of Restatement,
Torts, Section 339 in applying the attractive nuisance doctrine,
which is a far more liberal view than that previously taken. The
"Supra, note 42, p. 742.
"Supra, note 31.
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restatement position seems to be a very desirable one from the
standpoint of all the parties involved. Full recognition is given
to the natural propensities of children and the fact that they are
often found trespassing on land whereon they may afterwards
discover some attractive and dangerous artificial condition and
be injured by it. The holding that a thing must be so especially
and unusually alluring to young children as to constitute an im-
plied invitation is quite indefinite, and it does not seem to this
writer that the Montana Supreme Court ever got around to say-
ing just where the line indicating the degree of attractiveness
would be drawn. Certain it is that it believed a thing could be
attractive to children and still not be attractive enough to give
grounds for implying an invitation. It seems better to meet the
problem squarely for what it is rather than to avoid it by the use
of a fiction. The children involved are trespassers and it is far
better to recognize them as such and to recognize also that in our
modern society we are capable of making needed exceptions to
the old established doctrines concerning trespassers when justi-
fied by modern circumstances.
The restatement view gives recognition to the right of the
landowner to develop his land, and only when the utility to the
possessor in maintaining the condition is slight as compared to
the risk to young children involved will it hold him liable, subject
to the qualification that he must take whatever reasonable safety
measures he can to protect children when he knows or should
know that they may be trespassing and so may come in contact
with and be injured by the instrumentality.
The restatement protects the landowner where it is proved
that the children appreciated the risk prior to intermeddling.
It would seem very doubtful whether it could often be proved
that the child recognized the full risk involved, but comment b
indicates that he must have been fully cognizant of it. It is a well
known fact that children quite often realize that a considerable
risk is involved in an undertaking but will go ahead in a spirit
of childish bravado and incur that risk, not realizing until too
late that they are more incapable of coping with it than they had
at first thought. In such a case can it fairly be said that they
recognized fully the risk involved? This author believes not and
believes that great caution should be used in deciding whether
there was full realization of the risk.
Finally the restatement will not hold the landowner liable
unless he was or should have been aware of the likelihood of tres-
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passes by children and the dangerous propensities of his instru-
mentality.
From the plaintiff's viewpoint, the adoption of the restate-
ment position will greatly facilitate the recovery of damages in
cases where all the dictates of human decency require that dam-
ages be awarded. Lawyers will no longer be hampered by the
necessity of proving that an instrumentality was so especially
and unusually attractive to children as to constitute an implied
invitation to them, nor will they be confronted with the often im-
possible task of proving that the dangerous instrumentality was
the thing that actually lured the child onto the land in the first
place. From the landowner 's standpoint, the restatement posi-
tion will cast upon him somewhat greater burdens in that he will
have to make more effort to inform himself as to whether children
will be likely to trespass, and whether they will be apt to discover
the dangerous condition after they get on the land; he will also
have to take into consideration ways and means of protecting such
children from injury which is unreasonably threatened by dan-
gerous instrumentalities which perchance they may not discover
before trespassing.
To sum up, adoption of the restatement view on attractive
nuisance should promote a much more equitable disposition of
the cases than has heretofore been had in Montana.
ROBERT W. MAXWELL
PRENATAL INJURY: RECOVERY OR ANOMALY?
En ventre sa mere is a term descriptive of an unborn child.
According to Black's Law Dictionary,1 for some purposes the law
regards an infant en ventre as in being. The examples given
are: it may take a legacy, have a guardian, and an estate may
be limited to its use. The common law, while it recognized and
protected the rights and interests of an unborn child in some re-
spects; flatly denied them in others, most obviously where a tort
was concerned. The rationale most relied upon seemed to be
that an unborn child was but a part of the mother, and had no
existence or being which could be subject to injury. This view in
the field of torts was flatly contradictory of recognition given
the rights of an infant en ventre sa mere in other branches of the
law.
1BLAcx's LAW DIrIONARY (4th ed. 1951) p. 619.
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